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Abstract 
In this paper I analyze whether an intervention program increases productivity and sales, by 
reducing potential procrastination problems that employees face at work. The intervention 
was introduced to stores in a large retail chain in Norway, and contained different tools that 
could lead to lower perceived costs of higher effort. 
In a difference-in-differences analysis I find that the intervention increases sales after a 14 
weeks long implementation period. Further analysis suggests that the positive effect on sales 
is particularly large for those stores reporting high compliance with the intervention, and for 
the smallest and the largest stores. Finally, it seems like the positive effect is particularly large 
during the busy Christmas season. 
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1. Introduction 
The world gets more and more competitive as a result of the increasing globalization. As 
competition strengthens, the need to perform more efficiently in order to survive is prominent, 
as those who do not may easily get driven out of the market. Many firms have realized this 
and have gone through various change processes. Traditionally, focus has been on structural 
changes, such as organizational changes or supply chain management, and issues like vertical 
integration and outsourcing have been widely used both in practice and academia. Gradually, 
behavioral aspects too have gained increased attention. The use of chief official bonuses and 
managerial trainings are well known. Moreover, consulting firms have increased in numbers 
offering consulting services to firms who seek to improve. Later, the use of various monetary 
incentives has been transferred down the organizational hierarchy, as a way to improve 
performance and productivity in all parts of the organization
1
. Putting together features of 
structural optimization and behavioral aspects one might think firms are already optimized. 
This is far from true, and there are many examples illustrating that firms do not operate 
optimally, see for example Bloom, Eifert, Mahajan, McKenzie, & Roberts (2011).  
Turning the focus towards behavioral aspects one important challenge is to induce employees 
to do the right activities in the most productive way, as this may not be the case and therefore 
represents an opportunity for firms to increase profitability. Employees act as agents in a 
classical principal-agent relationship and moral hazard are likely present. One way to 
overcome moral hazard is to build incentives to align the agents’ interests closer to the 
principals. However, this is not the only problem, as recent research also shows that planning 
fallacy and self-control problems among employees leads them to “throw money out of the 
window”, thus not working optimally neither for the principal or oneself as an agent (Cadena, 
Schoar, Cristea, & Delgado-Medrano, 2011). If this is the case, then employees are 
procrastinating higher effort for immediate gratification. As a result of this, monetary 
incentives, like a monthly bonus, might not be enough to induce optimal behavior. 
This paper analyzes the effect on sales from one possible way to organize and structure a 
combination of tools and incentives as behavioral mechanisms. Its objective is to investigate 
whether a change program contributed to increased sales, and maybe thus serve as a way of 
                                                 
1
 For an extensive review of Human Resource Management and productivity see Bloom, N., & Reenen, J. V. 
(2010). Human Resource Management and Productivity. Centre for Economic Performance, LSE, CEP 
Discussion Papers. 
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overcoming potential procrastination among sellers. If the program succeeds in increasing 
sales, then this paper may contribute to increased understanding of how to overcome 
procrastination problems at the workplace, by suggesting several tools in which might induce 
employees to shift their allocation of time to a more favorable combination. 
The program, hereby referred to as the treatment, is developed by a company named Maze 
and introduced in a large electronic consumer goods chain named Expert. The treatment 
consists of several tools in which are supposed to change the behavior of the employees, 
which eventually is supposed to make them more productive and increase sales. The treatment 
introduces a new planning tool to organize daily and weekly work tasks. In addition, a new 
morning pep talk is held daily to give feedback on performances, recapitulate on the previous 
day, and to work on improvement potentials. Furthermore, by increased attention given to 
customers and feedback from sales training, the treatment is supposed to turn focus towards 
improved customer service and sales. 
There are many reasons why these treatment tools could affect sales. The main argument for 
employee’s productivity not already being maximized is that many employees procrastinate at 
work. Procrastination is the tendency to delay or avoid unpleasant tasks for immediate 
gratification, even though being better off by just pulling the task off immediately. The 
procrastination phenomena have been subject to much research the recent decades (Akerlof, 
1991; Cadena, et al., 2011; Fischer, 2001; Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 
1999). One effect that the treatment tools may create is implicit deadlines, which are shown to 
help overcoming self-control problems and or procrastination (Ariely & Wenterbroch, 2002; 
Brunnermeier, Papakonstantinou, & Parker, 2008; Herweg & Muller, 2011). Furthermore, 
setting goals and targets may work inspirational and may have an effect on productivity (Jain, 
2009; Locke & Latham, 1990; Wu, Heath, & Larrich, 2008). In addition, daily pep talks and 
sales observation provides a feedback function, which have shown to be an important feature 
affecting productivity and work satisfaction in other research (Cadena, et al., 2011; Drake, 
Wong, & Salter, 2007; Jawahar, 2006). Having set goals and targets enables feedback to be 
precisely related to this. Finally, treatment may start a more intensive social process including 
cooperation, comparison and competition. This may happen, inter alia, as performances are 
reviewed in joint pep talk meetings each morning, based on actual sales data from the 
previous day. Social processes have in fact shown to be very important for productivity in 
other relations (Ashraf, Bandiera, & Jack, 2011; Cohn, Fehr, Herrmann, & Schneider, 2011). 
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I investigate the effect of the treatment by using a cross-sectional panel data from 98 different 
Expert stores in Norway, based on weekly data for a total period of 72 weeks. Weekly gross 
sales are the dependent variable measuring whether productivity has increased or not. Some 
stores are control stores prior to implementation, then becoming treated stores at time of 
implementation; other stores are used for comparison and are only operating as control stores. 
This makes it possible to analyze the effect by using a difference-in-differences method, such 
that the differences between treated- and control stores prior and after implementation are 
being compared. The increase or decrease in the difference becomes an estimate of the 
treatment effect. The analyses control for time- and store fixed effects. This difference out 
effects that do not vary in time but varies between stores, and effects that varies in time but do 
not vary between stores. In addition, the econometric model becomes even stricter having 
used heteroskedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. 
The analysis suggests that there is an effect of the treatment. The first regressions indicated no 
effect, however, when further analysis was conducted this seemed to be due to an 
implementation period. After a 14 weeks implementation period, the regression results show a 
statistical significant increase in sales of almost 5 percent for treated stores compared to 
control stores. Furthermore, when grouping stores based on how well the store manager felt 
they complied with the requirements of the treatment, those stores evaluating their effort in 
the top half increased their sales by over 4 percentage points more than those treated who 
were in the bottom half. For the compliant stores, the total estimated effect of the treatment 
suggested almost a 7 percent increase in sales. In addition, when grouping stores based on 
their size, treatment seemed to work well only on either the smallest or the largest stores, 
which could be explained by that the strength of the treatment tools depends on the 
composition of- and number of employees. Finally, when testing the robustness of the 
estimates, I find that the results get weaker when excluding data from Christmas season sales, 
suggesting that the treatment effect is stronger during this period and that the estimates are 
somehow driven by this period. However, running the same regression only including stores 
that seemed to have greatest effect of the treatment, still showed a statistical significant 
increase in sales. 
The results have the same tendencies as what Cadena et al. (2011) finds, in that relatively 
feasible centrally designed programs can be used to increase the profitability of firms. 
However, it is important to remember that this study was from the bank sector, which could 
be quite different in nature from consumer goods stores. That program used simple tools as 
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small prizes, feedback, and reinforcement from the branch manager to induce small changes 
in the behavior of employees. In this analysis, the results are also consistent with theory in 
that short deadlines, setting goals, immediate- and continuous feedback, and social 
comparison and competition may work as incentives to improve performances. Unfortunately, 
due to the nature of how the treatment was introduced and the availability of data, it is 
impossible to find good estimates of how strong each of these parameters are. 
The paper is organized in the following way. First I present the treatment, which includes a 
description of Expert Norge AS. Then I review some of the existing literature on 
procrastination and techniques to improve productivity, and relate these to the treatment tools. 
This is followed by a presentation of the empirical strategy and the dataset. Then I move on to 
presenting the results of the analysis and interpret these. Finally, I draw a conclusion based on 
the findings and discuss final views on these. 
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2. The Maze Treatment 
Expert Norge AS 
Sales efficiency and “hit rate” problem 
With a market share of approximately 30%, Expert Norge AS is one of the leading 
distributors of consumer electronics and electrical materials in Norway. In April 2012, Expert 
in Norway consisted of 166 stores, respectively 61 Expert-owned stores and 105 owner-
occupied stores using the Expert brand. In addition they run and manage an online store, 
www.expert.no. In 2011 total annual revenues for Expert Norge AS and their owner-occupied 
stores reached a total of about 3.6 billion NOK, with approximately 1500 employees. Expert 
faces sharp competition with other electronic consumer goods chains like Elkjøp and Lefdal. 
In addition, they face a relatively new source of competition, namely online stores, which 
keep on increasing in numbers as more and more consumers prefer to order their goods 
online. One could also argue that sales of electronic goods are very similar to sales of many 
other consumer goods (such as toys, interior, clothes, and so on) making this research 
applicable to more than just sales of this specific type of goods. 
Expert says their main goal is to give visitors the best customer experience through direct 
customer assistants in one of their stores or through their online store. Expert claim they can 
accomplish this through their core values, which are among others “mercenary sprit”, 
“trustworthiness”, and “customer focus”. The idea of business is to generate profitable 
growth, and in order to accomplish this, Expert tries to take advantage of synergy effects 
through centralized services (such as accounting, administration, IT services, and more). 
Newly recruited employees at Expert receive a booklet that summarizes Expert’s core values 
and priority areas. In this booklet they try to put a lot of focus on teamwork, care and 
engagement at the workplace. If this is true, in that Expert actually accomplish to create this 
kind of social work environment, then this could be important for the treatment to have any 
effect on sales. 
The recent year’s development in their annual revenues has not been satisfactory for Expert, 
and during the fall of 2010 they started a change process in cooperation with Frost Nordic, a 
retail and consumer consulting firm. They decided that one of their main focuses of 
improvements were to be the operating activities. Expert wanted to increase their profitability 
in each store, by cutting costs and increasing their sales efficiency.  Furthermore, they 
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narrowed it down to primarily focusing on increasing their “Hit Rate”. This is a ratio between 
numbers of sales and numbers of customers, thus Expert wanted to sell more to people who 
visited one of their stores. In addition, they recognized that there was a huge gap in sales 
performances among sellers, and wanted to reduce this variance. The 20% best stores, 
measured on average “Hit Rate”, performed substantially better than the remaining 80% of 
the stores. Lifting the performance of these remaining 80% could potentially have huge effect 
on sales. Frost Nordic recommended Expert to use Maze in order to increase their “Hit Rate” 
ratio, as Maze claims to have developed a program that systematically organizes and 
structures activities leading to employees focusing on the right activities, which in turn is 
supposed to lead to increased “Hit Rate” and sales. This program is also supposed to generate 
easily readable and up to date target figures, such that necessary measures and adjustments 
can be executed accordingly. 
Pay structure, monetary rewards and non-monetary rewards in Expert-owned stores 
The pay-scheme in Expert varies with the position you hold. Store managers have a basic 
wage and a bonus system on top of this. The bonus is duplex, and is calculated based on two 
separate methods. First, they can receive up to one month extra base salary annually, based on 
goal achievements measured on quarterly EBITDA
2
 figures. Second, managers can up to 
double their annual basic wage by performing at least 20% and more above planned results at 
store level, measured on annual EBITDA. In addition, there are some other requirements 
regarding goal achievement on sales of insurances and financing. For section leaders (e.g. 
data, mobile, home electronics, and so on) the bonus scheme is similar. Hence, what this 
means is that there are strong incentives for leaders in each store to improve sales and cut 
costs, as both affects EBITDA. 
The rest of the employees in Expert are offered tariff wages. They too, however, can affect 
their final pay slip by performing well, as there is also a bonus pay incentive available for 
them. Every second month the aggregated sales in a store is compared to the budget and some 
of the excess is divided between employees. One quarter of this bonus is split equally between 
all employees, including those working in the storage and in the cashier, and three quarters is 
distributed based on each individual seller’s sales record. In addition, a seller receives 
commission on insurances that he/she sells to the customers. 
                                                 
2
 EBITDA - Earnings before interests taxes depreciation and amortizations 
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Several times during a year Expert arrange store manager meetings for all managers in 
Expert-owned stores. This is to discuss latest developments and performances, to share 
experiences, to find improvement areas, and to discuss new techniques and routines to 
implement and test. In the first quarter of 2011 they also arranged for a sales training course 
for around 800 sellers, both from Expert-owned- and owner-occupied stores. However, this 
was not part of the treatment program, happened well ahead of it, and all Expert stores were 
subject to it. Hence, this should not affect the analysis. 
Expert focuses on giving attention to, and reward, those who perform at the very top. This is 
why they annually elect the best stores and the best seller of the year. These prices are 
awarded in a mutual setting during one of the store manager meetings. The store of the year 
election is based on six different performance categories, and there is one winner in each 
category. The performance measurements are based on progress and goal achievements. The 
winning stores receive a money price to be spent on social purposes. The seller of the year is 
based on the most selling seller and the winner receives a considerable personal monetary 
price in reward. In addition, at regional level, there is tradition for showing attention to and 
awarding diplomas to the best performers. Some even have a “Wall of Fame” award. 
However, there is no similar official event in each individual store. 
The treatment 
Treatment was first introduced in April 2011 in 8 Expert-owned pilot stores. After this trail 
period, during the autumn of 2011, treatment was gradually introduced in all of the remaining 
Expert-owned stores. The tools that Maze implemented in Expert can be separated into three 
main categories. Unfortunately they were all implemented simultaneously and there are no 
clear measurements of each category; hence, it is difficult to separate the effects of each tool. 
The overall performance goal of the implementation of Maze was to increase the “Hit Rate” 
by at least 3 percentage points from the original average rate of about 24%.  
Control system and planning tool 
The Maze computer system is called “MyMaze” and works as a control- and feedback 
system. It can be used all the way from store managers to top management. The latter can 
easily generate various kinds of reports, like sales- and “Hit Rate” reports. As it is integrated 
with relevant systems from Expert it generates up-to-date sales reports. This enables top 
management to easily measure performances and to make necessary adjustments. The system 
is, however, primarily for store manager usage in daily store management. 
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MyMaze facilitates store managers in planning their weekly tasks. This is done by setting up a 
schedule in a predefined week layout. In this planning process the store manager can use 
predefined work tasks that are required or recommended being done. All such predefined 
work tasks contain more detailed description, such that it can be carried out as intended. The 
planning structure facilitates the store manager and the other employees to get an overview of 
tasks ahead, to prioritize and allocate their time more optimally, and to focus on the activities 
that generate more sales and higher “Hit Rate”. Although only store managers can operate in 
this system, it is possible to make a print out the daily work tasks such that other employees 
can follow the schedule. In Appendix 2 Exhibit 1, there is an extract of an example of a daily 
schedule in an Expert store, although there are more advanced features available in the 
system. This planning tool was available from the start of the treatment for superior tasks, but 
starting from the beginning of November 2011 it was required to be used to organize all tasks. 
At the end of each week the store manager receives an evaluation survey that they must 
complete. This survey provides feedback on how well the store performed the recent week, 
whether they reached their targets, and so on. The store manager then has to evaluate their 
own performance, and be liable for their actions. This weekly feedback function serves as a 
reminder of their responsibility, a way to see whether one does things the right way or not, 
and a way to motivate the store manager for the next week. Also, region managers can use 
this self-evaluation from store managers as a way of monitoring their behavior. In addition, 
their evaluations and achievements are being reviewed and compared when store managers 
meet at their joint store manager meetings. The intention is that those who did well get social 
recognition in reward, and those who did less well are supposed to sharpen their competitive 
spirit.  
Clicking 
In order to improve on the gap between the best performers and the remaining sellers, Maze 
asked the best sellers what they did differently from others.  The response had one common 
feature, which was that the best sellers always had in mind that they wanted to create some 
kind of connection with the customers. This connection could vary, like a smile and a 
welcome, or by just informing the customer that they were recognized and that they would get 
assistance soon if they were busy assisting other customers. 
Maze made use of this insight by making all sellers aware of this effect and to remind them 
about it. This was done by providing them with clickers. A clicker is just a hand-held counter, 
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similar to the one flight attendances use when counting passengers in the aircraft or like a 
pedometer (but a click rather than a step). The idea behind the clicker is that it makes them 
aware of that they are meeting the customer, reminding them what they are supposed to do 
and the importance of this, and in retrospect to see its effect on sales. Each time they get some 
kind of connection with a customer, they “reward” themselves with a click. The criterion for 
having a qualified click is not very strict, but at least they have to make eye contact and 
communicate some words with the customer. At the end of each working day the store 
manager summarizes all clicks and puts them into MyMaze. The daily short-term “Click 
Rate” target was set at 100%, which means that, on average, each customer visiting the store 
should experience at least one kind of “connection” during their visit. “Click Rate” is the ratio 
between number of clicks and number of customers visiting the store. 
Weekly meetings, daily pep talks and sales guidance 
Approximately once a week the store managers are supposed arrange a meeting with all the 
section leaders to discuss latest developments regarding sales. MyMaze generates “Hit Rate” 
and sales figures which can be used to show trends, developments, comparison with other 
stores, and so on. The intention is that feedback serves as a way to make employees 
competitive, motivated and aware of their challenges. The feedback also indicates to them 
whether they work efficient or not, if they allocate their time doing the right activities. If they 
do work efficiently they get immediate rewarded through social status and positive feedback. 
The presumably more importantly meeting is the daily pep talk. Every morning a 10-15 
minutes pep talk or morning meeting is held. The store manager prepares by printing out 
figures or graphs from MyMaze showing whether they reached their intended “Click Rate” 
targets, “Hit Rate” targets and sales figures from the previous day. An example of such figure 
can be seen in Appendix 2 Exhibit 2. Essential for the store manager is to recognize positives 
and negatives. In the beginning of the meeting, the store manager asks open questions about 
yesterday’s performance. They may also do a follow-up on issues agreed upon at the previous 
morning meeting. Focus then turns to analyzing and discussing the various figures, and 
agreeing on adjustments to be made for the upcoming day in order to improve. Hereafter, the 
weekly planner is being reviewed to check if tasks have been completed, and if not make 
necessary adjustments or if relevant delegate work tasks.  Finally, they are supposed to set a 
daily sales target, motivate each other and create focus and excitement on work tasks ahead. 
This may serve as a sharpener to competitive spirit, but at least it should bring focus on what 
is intended being done during their work day. 
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In addition, the store manager is supposed to frequently follow up on employees. This is done 
by observing sellers in action with customers, and then providing constructive feedback on 
their communication and interaction with the customers. Areas of potential improvements and 
positives are communicated, and follow-up on this feedback is important. Also, during the 
work day, the store manager takes notes on each sale persons “Click Rate”, and may take 
measures if necessary. 
Kick-off meetings 
Prior to implementation, in June 2011, all store managers participated in one common kick-
off meeting. The agenda for this meeting was to learn about Maze; hence, it did not contain 
general management/sales training beyond this scope. First part of the meeting was a 
workshop were the store managers got an introduction of the thematic structure of Maze, and 
more specifically on how they were to use it in their daily work. The second part of the 
meeting was more details on the tools to be used, as well as technical operations in MyMaze.  
Then a local meeting for all regional store managers was held by the regional manager closer 
to implementation date. This meeting was primarily to repeat on what they learned from the 
kick-off meeting and to discuss potential questions or issues prior to implementation. The 
night before implementation the region- and store manager held a staff meeting in the store to 
teach employees about the program. They were introduced to the clicker and its related 
function, informed about the daily morning pep talks, and so on. The following day the tools 
were launched for store usage. No additional training was given, except from experiences 
gradually shared in practice. 
Treatment and control stores 
To analyze the impact of the Maze system on the performance of Expert stores I needed 
comparable groups of treated stores and control stores. The decision to implement Maze or 
not were insusceptible to influence, as it was taken independently and prior to the start of the 
research. The decision of the first 8 pilot stores was made by Expert. Five of these stores were 
chosen for treatment as they were all relatively large and with high sales figures. In order to 
have some variety they also included an additional 3 smaller randomly chosen stores. After 
the pilot period, Expert made the decision to implement Maze in all of their Expert-owned 
stores. These stores are spread out geographically all over Norway with various sizes and 
locations (e.g. city center, shopping malls). This means that all Expert-owned stores part of 
the sample are treated at some point, none of them are exclusively in the control group. 
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Hence, the stores that is treated or not is based on selections. As this is not a randomized 
process this could lead to a potential selection bias. However, different timing of 
implementation allows to carefully accounting for this potential selection bias, as shown in 
the empirical strategy. In addition, this is strengthened by the fact that all Expert-owned stores 
are control stores prior to treatment, such that there are observations both prior to- and during 
treatment. In total there are 8 pilot stores and 49 other Expert-owned stores that are part of the 
sample used in this paper, and all of them received treatment during the sample period. 
With regards to the stores that are exclusively in the control group, these are owner-occupied 
stores that Expert Norge has provided data from. In total there are 41 control stores that are 
part of the sample and none of them are treated. It is necessary to point out that, even though 
selection bias may be present, the difference between an Expert-owned store and owner-
occupied store, from the customer’s point of view, is limited. Both types of stores run the 
same weekly offers. Overall they offer the same electronic brands. The branding is also one of 
the main features provided by Expert Norge to the owner-occupied stores, and is assumingly 
very similar from one store to another. According to HR-manager in Expert Norge AS, Per 
Ole Thorsen, a customer should not experience much of a difference between any Expert 
stores, whether it is an Expert-owned store or an owner-occupied store. That being said, he 
believes that some Expert-owned stores are best in appearing the way Expert optimally want 
their stores to appear, although admitting that owner-occupied stores are quite good at this 
too. One potential selection bias could be that the largest Expert stores are mainly part of the 
treated group, however, time invariant fixed effects reduces this effect. The average weekly 
sale is about 85% greater for treated stores compared to control stores, whereas store size is 
about 100% greater for treated stores compared to control stores.  
Changes in monetary incentives with treatment 
There was only one change in monetary incentive involved in the treatment, and this was a 
change in the bonus-scheme to store managers and section leaders. The difference was that 
“Hit Rate” became part of the parameters that decided bonus payments. However, according 
to Expert, this system was too complex and did not reflect actual performance. As a result of 
this, Expert returned to their previous bonus-scheme, such that their bonus-scheme is now 
equal to what it was prior to treatment. However, as part of the annual award of the best store, 
there is a new non-monetary prize to be won. This is the “golden clicker award”, where the 
best store manager, based on progress and co-worker surveys, wins a golden clicker. The 
golden clicker is similar to the clickers that they have used at work, only painted in a golden 
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color, thus being a symbol of excellent performance. This is clearly more of a symbolic non-
monetary reward. 
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3. Theory and Existing Literature  
Why should we expect to see an impact of Maze on sales? 
This question is related to why this is an empirical interesting research. In order to give a 
reasonable answer to this question the potential problems that Expert faces in their work to 
improve their sales records needs to be identified. There are obviously various issues that may 
affect how well Expert perform, whether it is related to top management, consumer spending 
level, price levels, margins and so on. This research focuses on Human Resource 
Management (HRM). Assuming that employees in Expert do not work optimally with respect 
to reaching highest possible sales; why is this and how can it improve? 
There are many potential reasons why employees working for Expert or other firms do not 
allocate their time and effort efficiently. This may be lack of sales training, poorly defined 
work descriptions, lack of devotion to work tasks and or insufficient knowledge about the 
products being sold. All of these reasons could be interesting HRM challenges, but in this 
research focus will be specifically directed at employee’s behavioral aspects of performance 
and productivity. It is not unlikely that employees at Expert, assumed not to work optimally, 
are just shirking at work. However, this could reasonably also be related to that human beings 
tend to delay, or even avoid, unpleasant (but required) tasks for immediate gratification. This 
may also happen at the workplace, even though employees know it is not according to their 
instructions or a favorable choice in the long run. This type of behavior, delaying something 
even though we’re better off just doing it, is called procrastination.  
Procrastination 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary procrastination is defined as; “the action or habit 
of postponing or putting something off”(Dictionary). Two main properties or reasons to why 
people procrastinate are argued to be present-biased preferences and unawareness of self-
control problems. The former relates to the decision maker having preferences that favors 
current well-being over future well-being. The latter just means that he/she is not fully aware 
about his/her self-control problems, leading him/her to be partially naïve about future 
preferences (Asheim, 2008). 
The behavioral problem of procrastination has been well documented (Fischer, 2001), but it is 
also intuitively prominent in our daily lives. For example, people continue to smoke even 
though they are aware of the health danger, preferring the immediate relaxation a smoke gives 
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over general health. Moreover, many postpone an annual control visit to the dentist, even 
though their bigger fear may be a comprehensive surgical treatment by the dentist as a result 
of not doing this annual check. Many people sign up for a monthly gym subscription 
memberships, only to spend limited time actually working out. This last behavior is studied 
by DellaVigna and Malmendier (2006), suggesting that many customers would actually have 
a lower average admission fee at the gym by purchasing an intuitively expensive 10-visit pass 
rather than a monthly subscription. Shu & Gneezy (2010) recently found that even positive 
activities with immediate benefits were subjects to procrastination and suggested this was 
because we predict to have more time to engage in such activities in the future. Interestingly 
they also find tendencies that limited time windows reduce procrastination. 
Many employees at Expert will find that some tasks are not as comforting to do as others. For 
example, in a sales situation it may be more comforting to assist customers that seek 
information rather than actively seeking to assist customers who are “just looking”. Similarly, 
it requires much more effort to do incremental sales rather than just providing what the 
customers requires. Intuitively, it is more unpleasant to actively pursue proactive sales, 
incremental sales, and use spare time to refill shelves, instead of going to the nearest 
computer to check Facebook, football scores or news. Even though they can earn more money 
by actively seeking to assist customers, they fall into the temptation of delaying this for 
immediate gratification. Another well used excuse to procrastinate is that there are too many 
other things to do and therefore not enough time to act the preferred way (Fischer, 2001). As a 
result of procrastination, a moral hazard problem exists in this principal-agent (employer-
employee) relationship, as the interests of owners and the related actions of the employees are 
not necessarily the same. One way to shrink this moral hazard problem is to align the interests 
of the two parties by building incentives that may induce the agent to act in the principals’ 
interests. The store manager position contains characteristics of both a principal- and an agent 
position, as he/she act as an agent for top management and as a principal to the remaining 
employees. In fact, many store managers are both store managers and sellers in their daily 
work, and they may face the same problems as the remaining employees with regards to 
procrastination. The idea behind the treatment is that stores start using treatment tools in order 
to help sellers overcome potential procrastination problems, but they might also help store 
managers too, in their work both as a principal and as an agent. 
Why are the potential behavioral problems that Expert employee faces procrastination and not 
just shirking? In order for this to actually be procrastination the employee must be better off 
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in the long run by doing what he/she is told rather than going the “easy way”. The most 
prominent reason why this is procrastination is that the total salary is tied to how well the 
employee perform. For store managers this could be a very large amount of money, but for 
sellers too this could be a substantial part of their annual salary. Another likely main reason 
for this to be procrastination is that high effort may result in a prominent career path, whether 
it is a promotion at current workplace or a good reference/recommendation if he/she decides 
to move on. In addition, network building seems to be as important as ever today. 
Establishing an image of you as having high work ethics may be very important in this 
process. Suddenly your colleague today may be the one who hires you for a dream job 
tomorrow? Obviously you would then want to be remembered as the hard working employee 
rather than the shirking employee. 
Time-inconsistent preference leads to procrastination, meaning that immediate well-being is 
prioritized above what we consider the best “long-run selves”(O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). 
Procrastination is closely related to self-control problems. When considering the best chances 
to have a successful career path, most would agree that hard work and commitment to work 
tasks would be important ingredients to achieve this. Hence, there should be a strong 
incentive to uphold a high level of work effort, as the immediate cost of doing so are quite 
small compared to the future benefit of potential store manager position or an even higher 
position due to excellent work in the past. However, when we change our view of the time 
horizon to a more limited one, future returns suddenly become less (worth) and the immediate 
cost high. This leads us into a self-control problem of procrastinating effort and tasks for 
immediate pleasure (Kaur, Kremer, & Mullainathan, 2010). One way to overcome such 
problems is to somehow increase immediate returns when the time horizon is short. How can 
the treatment accomplish this? First it provides minimum daily targets (“Click Rate”); second 
it imposes daily (artificial) deadlines; third it provides immediate feedback; and fourth it 
penalizes procrastination by making employees responsible for their effort in a social setting 
with colleagues. These effects may be seen as a way of providing commitment devices, such 
as Kaur et.al (2010) found to enhance self-control. 
Model of procrastination 
Many researchers have been modeling procrastination in different ways (Akerlof, 1991; 
Fudenberg & Levine, 2006; O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). One of the more prominent ones 
are the work of hyperbolic discounting by O’Donoghue and Rabin (1999). This model says 
that a person’s intertemporal preference at time t can be represented by a utility function: 
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The total utility   is the intertemporal preference from time t perspective, which is the sum 
of current utility    and future utility. The parameter   represents the long-run time-consistent 
impatience, or what is considered as the fact that people in general are impatient. Said 
differently, people tend to prefer well-being soon rather than later, at all times. Time-
inconsistency on the other hand is related to present biased preferences, that some give 
relative more weight to events that are closer in time. The future utility, or the utility from 
time   to T is subject to this hyperbolic discounting of  , which represents that some enjoy 
immediate gratification (time-inconsistency if    ) over future benefits. The decision 
maker wants to maximize his/her utility at any time, and makes adjustments accordingly. 
How is this relevant to Expert employees? It has been argued that Expert employees 
sometime in the future will gain from increasing their current effort at work. Hence, what they 
individually need to determine is when the optimal time (    ) is to increase their effort in 
order for their utility to still be maximized. Because future benefits, such as a successful 
career path or higher bonus payments are only available in the long term, those benefits will 
be discounted by both the impatience factor   and the present bias factor  , and thus the 
utility gained from these benefits become relatively small compared to the actual future value. 
In order to realize future benefits the employees must increase their current effort. This comes 
at a cost, which is increased   both in current period and future periods. Even though these 
costs might be small, they will be perceived as great relative to the more heavily discounted 
future benefit.   
If Expert is to succeed with inducing their employees to choose high efforts at work, the 
utility that this high effort offers must exceed their current utility at low effort. Assume that 
utility can be expressed as        ( ) for all      , and         ( )     (   
 ) 
for    . Furthermore, assume that  ( )    if the employee chooses not to exert high effort 
at work and  ( )    if the employee chooses to exert high effort. What the employee gains 
from exerting high effort at time    is B, which is the future benefit consisting of, for example, 
higher pay (bonuses) or a better future career path, received in period T.  
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Employees will choose to procrastinate at time    if the utility gained from exerting low effort 
exceeds utility gained from exerting high effort: 
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Rearranging this gives 
              
Let         denote weeks of work until quitting. Thus, he/she will procrastinate as long 
as: 
        
From this equation further analysis can be carried out. Either the left hand side of the equation 
must increase or the right hand side must decrease if the incentive to procrastinate is to 
decrease. As     increases in time,     decreases, and all else equal, this will increase the left 
hand side. Said differently, the gratification from procrastinating is decreasing in time. This is 
because the future benefit is getting closer in time (value less discounted) and the cost of 
exerting higher effort becomes less (fewer periods that c will incur). This is the decision 
parameter for the employee; at what time       the employee will choose to show higher 
effort and thus not to procrastinate as much anymore. 
There are an additional two parameters that can change on the left hand side of the equation. 
A change in the perceived future benefit (B) can also alter the decision between 
procrastinating or not. There are several ways this parameter can increase, whether it is an 
increase in bonus related pay, an increase in the perceived importance of establishing a good 
reputation, or even smaller benefits received more frequently such as praise from the store 
manager. If this parameter increases, the left side of the equation increases, and so does the 
incentive not to procrastination. The last parameter on the left hand side is the present bias 
factor  , which also affects the effort decision. The less a person enjoys immediate 
gratification, the less time-inconsistent he/she is, the greater   becomes. If this parameter 
increases, the left hand side increases, and the incentive to procrastinate decreases. However, 
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this parameter is probably more difficult to influence as it is closely related to the individual 
persons self. 
Finally, on the right hand side of the equation we find the cost that will incur for exerting 
higher effort. If this decreases, the incentive to procrastinate will decrease, and vice versa. 
This is probably where the main opportunity for Expert is, as they already have bonus systems 
and possible career paths as part of their future benefits. Increasing future benefits 
additionally could be expensive and may have limited effect as it is heavily discounted. 
Therefore, by somehow decreasing the perceived cost of higher effort may be a prominent 
way of increasing the effort of employees. 
As previously mentioned, Cadena et al. (2011) did an experiment in a Colombian bank that 
faced a time-allocating problem among their loan officers. Optimally the bank wanted 
sourcing of new clients and credit collection efforts to be frequently spread out during the 
month, as this would lower costs of cash flow management. The tendency was, however, that 
this work was postponed until the last two weeks of the month, just before the monthly 
bonuses were calculated. The researchers introduced a new program with small built in prizes 
that could be won during the first two weeks of the month, inducing loan officers to allocate 
their effort/time more equally during the month. Their findings show a 30% significant 
increase in goal achievements during the first two weeks of the month and a strong shift in 
allocation of tasks during the month. This is clearly a sign of procrastination affecting 
productivity and suggests one simple mechanism to reduce this behavioral problem. More 
specifically, they set short term targets in order to reach their long term monthly goal, 
inducing behavior to change by adding a short term benefit. This particular research also 
showed an increase in prosperity at work, which may suggest that the perception of the cost 
was overstated by the employees.  
As presented under the treatment section, the treatment introduces some tools that were 
supposed to increase sales. These tools are effectively trying to affect the individual’s utility 
maximization decision by changing size of some of the parameters in the final procrastination 
model presented above. In the following I will discuss some of the potential outcomes of 
these tools, and how they might induce the utility maximization of individuals to shift towards 
not procrastinating. 
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Deadlines 
The procrastination model argues that the cost of higher effort is an important parameter in 
the individual’s decision between procrastinating or not. It is possible to argue that deadlines 
might reduce the net perceived cost of exerting higher effort, as employees have a more 
limited time window in which they have to perform and thus perceive the cost as less. The 
cost of performing in limited time windows (within the deadline) might be perceived smaller, 
as the cost of showing high effort only for a day or a limited period is quite small compared to 
an indefinite future period. It is also possible to argue that having a deadline of some kind is 
like a commitment device, in that within the time window prior to the deadline results must be 
delivered, which potentially can help some with their self-control problems. If this is the case, 
in that the perceived cost of high effort is less, then this might be enough to induce some to 
choose not to procrastinate. This is the same as reducing the   in the final model of 
procrastination. Recall that employees probably do not want to procrastinate as this leaves 
money out of the pocket, such that deadlines become more of a way to help managing the 
self-control problems.  
Brunnermeier et al. (2008) show that self-imposed deadlines might remedy on the 
procrastination problem, and exogenous deadlines even more so. Expert sellers does not face 
a direct deadline, however, this insight might build on the argument that daily pep talks 
discussing yesterday’s performance may provoke self-imposed pressure to deliver (within a 
daily deadline) and an exogenous daily deadline to deliver clicks and sales. Ariely et al. 
(2002) finds that self-imposed (costly) deadlines helps overcome procrastination, as deadlines 
work as a commitment device. A more recent study by Herweg et al. (2011) find that simple 
deadlines can help with self-control problems to improve performance, which is probably 
relevant for Expert sellers. If sellers can overcome their self-control problems of not doing 
proactive sales by using deadlines, this might lead to improved sales records. By contrast, 
Burger & Charness (2010) find no effect on procrastination of externally-posed restrictions, 
and that completion of studies was actually 50% higher for those students without interim 
deadlines, showing different results and that this is still a discussable area of research. 
Goals and targets 
Goals and targets may work as a future benefit and or as a perceived cost reduction. A goal 
provides something to stretch towards, and becomes a milestone to be reached. Daily targets 
are almost like the daily measurement of success for an Expert employee. If they succeed in 
reaching targets and or goals at work, they receive positive feedback, a happy store manager, 
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positive self-confidence, and so on. This might be perceived as a benefit, although not a very 
large one. Remember, however, that the discounting of this benefit is not as heavily as other 
future benefits, as it is received in the near future. Also, recall that the cost of exerting slightly 
higher effort on a daily basis is not very large either. Hence, although closely related to 
feedback, which is described more in details in the next section, goals and targets may 
increase the future benefits in the procrastination model, creating stronger incentives not to 
procrastinate. If this is true, then working with the tasks that will gain you this extra benefit is 
probably also less costly, which might just lower the perceived cost of the effort slightly too. 
In order to have a clear view of which direction Expert want their organization to move in, 
they introduced a clear long term goal (increase “Hit Rate”) and a daily short term target (be 
at a certain “Click Rate”). What this does is basically providing different measurable targets. 
Goals and targets can be used to provide precise feedback as these may be measurable on a 
daily basis. In addition, setting goals might work as an inspiration factor or something to 
stretch towards, as long as it is found challenging and measurable. Setting goals are shown to 
have positive effects leading to increased performance. Locke et al. (1990) examined reasons 
to why this is so. Wu et al. (2008) show (using prospect theory) that goals may increase 
performance if used as reference points, which is consistent with what Expert does using “Hit 
Rate” and “Click Rate”. Furthermore, a theoretical study by Jain (2009) argues that goals 
might have a negative effect on performance if not set properly. If goals are too easy, the 
procrastination effect dominates, leading to a situation where you’re better off with no goals. 
Hence, too easy goals become a pillow to rest on, instead of acting as an encouraging 
mechanism. Similar results are found by Cochrane & Tesser (1996) who also focuses on the 
importance of goal difficulty as the powerful attribute in goal setting. Therefore, it seems 
important that Expert does not set the “Hit Rate” goal and the daily “Click Rate” target too 
low, as this might endanger improvement potentials in the treatment. Nevertheless, set at an 
appropriate level it may work inspirational to employees and be a basic tool to provide precise 
feedback. 
Feedback and reinforcement 
The argument regarding feedback is closely related to the discussion regarding goals and 
targets. Expert store managers give daily feedback to their employees during the daily pep-
talk and by observing and responding to sellers in action. There are several ways sellers 
receive feedback. First, the clicker may works as an immediate feedback reward mechanism. 
Said differently, sellers receive a small benefit (“a click”) each time they make a connection 
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with the customer, which just might make it slightly less burdensome to increase effort a little 
bit. Secondly, treatment might add an additional benefit each morning by providing feedback 
on yesterday’s performances, leading to that the sellers might get socially rewarded, receive 
praise from the store manager, and or increase their self-esteem. Finally, the same might 
happen when sellers receive direct feedback from the store manager after being observed in 
an actual sales situation. Positive feedback is like a benefit. If, however, the feedback is 
negative, but constructive, feedback on potential improvement areas, then this is not an 
immediate benefit. However, if the seller succeeds in improving, then this might just be an 
even higher boost in self-confidence and self-esteem. In combination, all these types of 
feedback might be enough to induce some to work harder, hence increased B and decreased c 
in our procrastination model.  
Feedback may potentially be an incentive to work harder. For example, students probably 
tend to read more prior to the exam, such that they will receive positive feedback through a 
good grade. Similarly, many find it easier to work out at the gym instructed by a personal 
trainer (PT) as they receive immediate feedback on their performance (in addition to being 
“pushed to the limit”). It is reasonable to think that this also applies to sellers at Expert. Even 
though the daily feedback is not relevant for each individual’s long term personal goals, it 
may increase their short term incentives to increase effort. Similarly, students do not believe 
that the difference between a top grade and a good grade in a subject will be decisive for their 
future career success; nevertheless, this grading process may still be an extra short-term 
benefit to work harder. 
Jawahar (2006) points out three benefits from performance appraisal feedback as it provides 
clear performance-based feedback to employees, potential influences on future performance 
and playing a significant role in the development of job attitudes
3
. Furthermore, Jawahar 
(2006) finds a positive relationship between satisfaction with appraisal feedback and attitudes 
towards their work. Also, satisfaction with feedback influences performance for employees, 
however, this only applied to employees who both evaluated others and was evaluated 
themselves. Similar effects are found by Doornbos, Simons, & Denessen (2008) who 
categorizes the possibility of collegial feedback as invaluable for work-related learning. By 
contrast, Jones, Kalmi, & Kauhanen (2010) finds no impact of supervisor feedback on 
performance, when this was given on economic aspects. Relevant to Expert it may seem like  
                                                 
3
 For a more extensive literature review of  performance feedback and its functions see Jawahar, I. M. (2006). 
Correlates of Satisfaction with Performance Appraisal Feedback. Journal of Labor Research, 27(2), 213-236. 
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that they can benefit from appraisal feedback as this can boost both future performance and 
attitudes towards the workplace and this effect might work even stronger as feedbacks are 
given in a mutually setting. Jones et al. (2010) does not find a significant impact of feedback 
on performance, however, their findings was less convincing when feedback was subject to 
information sharing, as it is in Expert. 
Ederer (2010) reviews widespread use of performance appraisal feedback. Among other 
factors he focuses on the evaluation effect, motivation effect, and feedback as a way to affect 
worker’s incentives to exert effort before information is revealed to them. In addition, he 
focuses on that performance can help workers do their job better by providing information on 
what to base their decisions on (sorting effect). He finds that beliefs about ability, from 
performance evaluations, impacts effort choices made by the worker and that it also represent 
a way to affect the morale of the employee. According to Drake et al. (2007) there is a 
positive relation between financial feedback (e.g. profit and sales) and perceived impact (as a 
measure of empowerment), and greater levels of perceived impact were associated with 
greater motivation. Benabou & Tirole (2000) also claims that empowerment may increase 
motivation and performance, as empowerment is good news for the agent and thus changes 
attitude towards the task. Empowerment is also stronger in situations where symmetric 
information is available. Expert too gives feedback based on financial figures (sales), 
providing a basis for employees to feel that they do have an impact on how well the store 
performs. In addition, as Ederer (2010) points out, feedback “to be revealed” (on next 
morning meeting) may increase effort among sellers.  
The clicker that employees use serves a dual purpose. Its main purpose is to remind the 
employees to connect with the customer. Their immediate reward is a click. The resulting 
effects may be both a reminding function and an immediate self-evaluated feedback on own 
performance. The latter could be very interesting, as the employee has to be constantly critical 
to how well he/she communicates with the customers. In addition, at the end of the day, the 
employee has to report numbers of clicks and by that evaluate his/her own performance on a 
daily basis. Step-counters or pedometers have been used in a different research to show 
increased physical activity by its usage, similar to clickers. They provide this immediate 
feedback on progress, a reminder function to stay active, and a daily number such that the 
porter may evaluate his/her own performance. Studies show that setting a daily step target 
additionally increased number of steps (Bravata et al., 2007). 
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Procrastination was eminent in the studies of Cadena et al. (2011). Interestingly there was also 
a second feature in their treatment, namely built in incentives for the branch manager. For the 
branch manager to receive this incentive he/she needed to encourage, remind, and update loan 
officers on their progress in achieving intended targets. In fact their study only show 
significant improvement when incentives to loan officers and branch managers when done in 
combination. This is again similar to Expert where there is a combination of mechanisms that 
may encourage sellers to be proactive instead of procrastinators. 
Symbolic rewards and social competition 
Turning back to the procrastination model, symbolic reward and social competition may be a 
way of reducing the perceived costs of higher effort, and may add an additional short term 
future benefit. If the work tasks become competitive, comparable, and challenging, the 
performance employee’s show on a daily basis may increase, the perceived cost of doing so 
reasonably lowers as the tasks are more fun to do, and the employee no longer feel as strong 
need to procrastinate. The short term social reward may also increase the short term future 
benefit, which comes additional to the already existing future benefits. 
Providing feedback may create a new aspect to the social process at the work place. This is 
because the treatment creates an opportunity for employees to (inherently?) compare and 
compete against each other. Going back to the PT session at the gym, it’s easy to imagine the 
inherent social pressure the setting at the gym creates, both by the well trained PT and the 
other progressive outfitters. Incentives come in various forms, both monetary incentives 
(rewards) and non-monetary incentives (rewards). There are various research supporting that 
non-monetary incentives, and more specifically symbolic reward, works well as an incentive 
(Ashraf, et al., 2011; Auriol & Renault, 2008; Kosfeld & Neckermann, 2011; Linz, Good, & 
Huddleston, 2006). Ashraf et al. (2011) did an experiment by dividing sellers into four groups 
with different kinds of pay systems. Those sellers that only had non-monetary rewards 
performed substantially better than both those who had extra monetary rewards and no 
incentives at all. Similar results find significant improvements on performance by just 
introducing a purely symbolic reward to students in a database project (Kosfeld & 
Neckermann, 2011). Non-monetary rewards serve at least a dual purpose, in promoting moral 
perception and commitment, and strengthen the individual’s perception of self-belief 
(Mathauer & Imhoff, 2006).  
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Hence, facilitating for social comparison and competition by providing easy comparable sales 
figures, both individually at each Expert store and at joint store manager meetings, is a 
cheaper-than-monetary-reward way of building new incentives that may enhance motivation 
and performance just as well as monetary rewards does. Indeed, even prior to the treatment, 
Expert had annual awards for the best performing stores and sellers both at a national level 
and at regional level. However, this might be even stronger when the treatment allows for this 
to be a daily feature, as this turns focus from long term to short term.  
Why does this social dimension create a symbolic reward? This arises from a combination of 
several factors as highlighted by Neckermann & Frey (2008). First there is a positive effect by 
performing well in that you gain status and esteem in the group (recognition). Second, getting 
positive feedback does something good to an individual, as this may boost self-confidence 
and self-belief and confirms that you do things the right way. Still it is important to design 
such symbolic award correctly, by minimizing the negative impact on those who “fail” in the 
same setting and only use rewards that are valued. One such reward is argued to be publicity 
(Neckermann & Frey, 2008), which one could argue is the case for Expert employees too as 
their performance is being evaluated by colleagues. What about those who do not perform 
that well, those who lose the competition with their colleagues and receive negative feedback? 
At this point it is important to underscore that feedback is given continuously and that 
employees can easily improve their stats from one day to the next. Furthermore, feedback is 
not given to affect employees negatively; rather negative feedback should be constructive and 
focus on areas to improve. That being said, research have shown that directly negative 
feedback significantly increase performance of those who receive it (Gino & Staats, 2011). 
Different research, however, points out that negative feedback has different effect across 
cultures, and that in Western cultures the respond to negative feedback may be ego-defensive 
and often dysfunctional (Stone-Romero & Stone, 2002). 
It has been argued that extrinsic rewards may crowd out the effect of intrinsic motivation 
(Benabou & Tirole, 2000). However, findings by Neckermann, Cueni, & Frey (2009) 
suggests that (social) awards are less likely to reduce the intrinsic motivation than monetary 
rewards as they are perceived more adequate with the activities that they perform (for 
example, information sharing, joint pursue of targets, and feedback to each other). The same 
study shows that social incentives have a sizeable and robust positive effect on employee 
performance. 
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There are reasons to believe that social comparison between co-workers play an important 
role in motivating and increasing performance. An analogous understanding of Cohn et al. 
(2011) supports this. They find that wage cut for only some of the co-workers had a greater 
effect on productivity (negative) than if they cut all co-workers wages. This signals the 
importance of social comparison, as co-workers react differently depending on if it occurs to 
some of them or all of them; hence, they compare themselves with others. Or as Auriol & 
Renault (2008) points out; what matters is earning more recognition than others. Similarly, if 
some co-workers see others perform well, reach targets, and succeed in their work, this may 
have a spillover effect and induce co-workers into greater efforts and performance.   
Barr & Serneels (2009) find strong relationships between workers in a workplace that show 
high reciprocity to each other and productivity, and argues that one way to achieve this is to 
stimulate a mixture of collegial competition and collegial cooperation. The treatment itself in 
Expert may stimulate to both these features, as it provides a competition between colleagues, 
but at the same time it requires cooperation in order to achieve their main goal. Moreover, 
four dominant systems or combination of HRM practices that firms choose to incorporate are 
identified (Ichniowski & Shaw, 2003). The more extreme it was with regards to implementing 
new innovative human management practices, the stronger effect it had on productivity. The 
practice Expert has implemented is most similar to the system or combination that had the 
least usage of such practices (“communications” system). This system or combination shows 
an increase in productivity of 1.4%. 
One of the main areas of Quality Management (QM) is the firms’ employees, and thus QM is 
related to HRM practices. Some essential process requirements of QM to contribute to HRM 
practices are suggested by Mathauer & Imhoff (2006) and include inter alia quality 
improvements efforts by employees, responsibility for sellers, and focus on participation, self-
realization and empowerment. All of these are by some degree current at Expert. 
Finally some critics of the value of this symbolic reward are eminent. There are three issues 
that might reduce the effect by some degree. The short term strength of the incentive on store 
level is weak, mainly because it is a daily reward that may be repeated too often. This in fact 
may reduce the effect of the incentive (Gavrila, Caulkins, Feichtinger, Tragler, & Hartl, 2005; 
O'Donoghue & Rabin, 1999). However, the incentive remains stronger for store manager, as 
these meetings occur rarer, although this means that their discount period is greater. Finally, 
Suvorov & van de Ven (2009) highlights that, even though small rewards can impact largely 
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on performance, as long as they have an informational content, this effect may be reduced the 
more standardized and the more known to the employee it is, and or the more objective 
performance measures the task has. 
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4. Empirical Strategy and Data 
Data 
The total sample period stretches from week 44 of 2010 until week 11 of 2012, which is 72 
consecutive periods of weekly data. All stores report complete sales data for the whole period, 
which means that they all have a common start time of observations and this makes the data 
set balanced. Treatment was first introduced in week 17 of 2011 for all 8 pilot stores. The 
remaining Expert-owned stores received treatment at different times starting from week 25 
and lasting until week 49 the same year. Most of these stores implemented the treatment 
during week 32 -35. There are several reasons for why the treatment implementation was 
stretched over time. One of the reasons was the capacity constraint of regional managers to 
participate in the store on the day of the treatment being introduced. Another reason was that 
this time period also involved summer holidays which limited available capacity to implement 
Maze. 
Data used in this study come from two sources. Weekly data has been collected from 
MyMaze for all treated stores. For control stores, data has been provided by the internal 
systems of Expert. As MyMaze import sales data directly from Expert’s internal systems, all 
data basically come from the same base system and is therefore expected to be reliable and 
consistent. The system that the data is provided from is also the base system for Expert’s 
financial reporting, and is subject to satisfy certain legal requirement. The system is also 
subject to an annual control/inspection by auditors that verify that their IT-systems and 
internal controls are satisfactory, increasing the reliability of the data. 
The key variable of performance is weekly sales, and this variable is reported in gross 
numbers. Hence, it does not account for losses in accounts receivables or potential returns 
from customers, but this is consistent across all stores. Sales are also the key dependent 
variable that will be used to analyze the effect of the treatment. In addition, in order to 
calculate “Hit Rate” and “Click Rate”, weekly data on number of customers visiting the store, 
number of people contacted during their visit and number of customers actually buying was 
collected.  Number of people buying is based on number of sales in the cash register. Number 
of customers visiting the store is based on counters placed at the entrance of the store. There 
are only a few of the owner-occupied stores that report this number; hence, the analysis will 
primarily focus on total sales rather than “Hit Rate”. The number of people contacted is, of 
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course, not part of the data reported from the control group, as this is data based on number of 
clicks reported during the day.  
One of the strong features of the data is that the timing of the treatment is different from one 
store to another, providing the dataset with variety. If all Expert-owned stores implemented 
treatment simultaneously, it would be harder to convincingly claim that potential increases in 
sales was in fact due to the treatment, and not something else coincidentally happening in 
these stores at that time. This is, however, less likely when the treatment implementation is at 
different times for different stores, and thus reduces the strength of the potential selection 
bias. 
Because I wanted to have a strongly balanced dataset I excluded some stores that only had 
partly data available in the sample period. Two of the Expert-owned stores were, during the 
sample period, re-launched as XL stores, which increased their sales by some number. To be 
sure that this did not affect the analysis I left these stores out of the sample. Secondly, about 
15 stores opened during the sample period, or for some other reason lacked sales data, and 
were also excluded from the sample. Of these stores, there were both treated and control 
stores. Finally, in order to be included in the sample, the stores had to have an average weekly 
sale of at least 50.000NOK. Even though fixed effects should cope well with store size 
differences, a very small store could be quite different in nature and react quite differently to 
outside events compared to more average sized stores. Only a few control stores were left out 
of the sample for this reason. 
In MyMaze the store manager weekly evaluates how well tasks related to the treatment have 
been completed. This evaluation consists of a survey with questions that are divided into three 
main categories. These categories are the quality of morning meetings (pep talks), morning 
routines and sales observations. The averages of these evaluations are reported in the data set, 
and it would be interesting, as a differential effect analysis, to see if the reported evaluations 
are consistent with how well the store actually performs. Therefore, I have divided those who 
reported the best average evaluation and those who reported the worst average evaluation into 
two separate groups to compare whether there are any differences in how well they perform. 
This has been done both for the morning meeting (pep talk) category and for the total average 
self-evaluation.  
In the total sample there are 98 stores and 7056 observations. From Table 1 we can see that 
the average weekly sale in an Expert store in this sample is about 556.000kr; however, the 
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standard deviation of 472.000kr is quite large. If we compare the treated stores to control 
stores, average sales are 689.000kr and 372.000kr respectively. For treated stores the lowest 
average weekly sale is about 150.000kr and the largest is about 2.200.000kr. For control 
stores these numbers are 58.000kr and 1.270.000kr respectively. An even greater difference 
between treated- and control stores can be found when looking at the approximate average 
physical sales-area in each store, were the average store size is 1000m2 and 500m2 
respectively. The smallest treated store is 165m2 and largest is 2450m2. The equivalent sizes 
in control stores are 120m2 and 1200m2. 
Empirical Strategy 
The data provided for this research project is cross-sectional panel data. This is because one 
observes the same stores over several time periods, and then pools the observation together 
for the analysis. A basic regression model for cross-sectional panel data is: 
  (     )                               
For this research   (     )    represent sales for one store at a specific time.       is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 if treatment has been introduced and 0 if treatment has not 
yet been introduced or if the store is in the control group.    is the intersection term and 
coefficient    is the percentage impact of the treatment compared to control stores, as sales 
are transformed into logistic non-linear numbers. Finally,     is the disturbance in the 
regression output, or the idiosyncratic error. 
  is the cross-section dimension denoting each Expert store.   is the time-series dimension 
denoting time, which in this paper is based on weekly data. Combining these dimensions is 
called two-way error component regression model (Baltagi, 2008, p. 35). 
The term    (       ) represent the so called entity fixed effects estimator (Wooldridge, 
2009, p. 482) or the effects of being a specific Expert store. Hence, these effects vary between 
stores but do not vary over time. For example, store size may differ from one store to another, 
but will stay constant from one week to another. Another example could be the availability of 
parking spots outside the entrance of the store, which varies from one store to another, but 
normally stays constant over time. 
The term    (      )  is known as the time fixed effects estimator which does not vary 
across Expert stores but varies over time (Stock & Watson, 2007, p. 362). For example, all 
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Expert stores have the same weekly offers, but these changes from one week to another. 
Another example could be the overall consumer spending level, which may be very similar 
across stores, but varies over time. 
I want to find partial effect of the independent variable, but lack many substantial variables 
affecting sales and which is also correlated with the treatment. Normally, this would create an 
omitted variable bias, as one of the assumptions in regression analysis requires  (   |   )  
 . Without fixed effects on    and   , these would be included in this error term. The 
important feature by applying entity- and time fixed effects is that it controls for store- and 
time heterogeneity. These fixed effects account for omitted variables bias arising from such 
unobserved variables. Thus, even though I do not include many independent variables in the 
regression to explain sales, I control for many effects by eliminating time-invariant and store-
invariant variables. The fixed effects model does allow for variables in    and    to be 
correlated with any of the independent variables, thus  (     |   ) does not have to equal 
zero as long as the remaining unobserved factors are still uncorrelated with the independent 
variable  (   |         )   , also called strict exogeneity of the independent variable 
conditional on    and     (Wooldridge, 2002, p. 266). 
The downside to this approach is that it cannot estimate coefficients for these fixed effects 
(Allison, 2009, p. 19), they are only controlled for. Said differently, any observed factors that 
may be included in    and     cannot be an independent variable    . Baltagi (2008, pp. 7-9) 
argues that panel data enables us to better study the dynamics of adjustments, give more 
informative data, and result in less biases resulting from aggregation over firms. On the other 
hand, data collection problems may occur using this procedure. 
All single observations are clustered on stores. Thus all observations on one store over the 
entire period are clustered into one group, one store is one group. Two problems in the nature 
of the data could potentially occur. First, the idiosyncratic error could be correlated within the 
clusters which lead to autocorrelation. Secondly, heteroskedasticity could be present as a 
result of varying cross-sectional sizes (different store sizes) which may lead to different 
variation of the treatment effect. This latter problem is met by robust standard errors 
correcting for heteroskedasticity. The former problem is faced by using heteroskedasticity- 
and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard error, more specifically a type of HAC called 
clustered standard errors (Stock & Watson, 2007, p. 367). Adding these features makes the 
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model even stricter than just having fixed effects, but this allows us to put more confidence in 
the outputs. 
The positive side of having a control group is that it provides a second difference. The first 
difference is to analyze the dataset for changes in sales when treatment is introduced (before-
after effect or difference-in-differences), and the second difference is to control for firms that 
are not treated (Bloom & Reenen, 2010). If the analysis was based entirely on the first 
difference (no control stores), we could observe tendencies of increased sales, which could 
falsely lead us to believe that the treatment worked.  This problem could arise if similar 
tendencies simultaneously happened to those stores that were not treated, caused by for 
example, increased consumer spending’s as a result of increased wealth and beliefs about the 
economic future. Including the control group in the analysis makes it possible to control for 
such common events, by differentiating out this event. Said differently, I compare changes in 
treated stores to control stores and cancel out common changes. Recall, however, that all 
stores are control stores prior to implementation. If no owner-occupied stores (exclusively 
control stores) were reported, a way around would be to set the cut off time earlier. This 
would allow for stores not yet treated to be exclusively control stores, however, this would 
not be full utilization of the dataset.  
During the Christmas season sales more than doubles. As such, the estimated treatment effect 
may be affected by the time horizon I utilize in the analysis, as this includes two Christmas 
seasons. I investigate the extent to which the effect estimates is driven by this period in two 
ways. The first way is to keep total sample period unchanged, but excluding those weeks that 
are closely related to these periods. The cut off is set at the last 6 weeks of the year (week 47-
52) and the first 3 weeks (week 1-3) of the New Year. The second way to exclude Christmas 
season sales is to analyze year 2011 only, and therefore exclude both year 2010 and 2012. In 
addition, I dropped the first 3 weeks (week 1-3) of 2011 and the last 6 weeks (week 47-52) of 
2011. The problem with this last analysis is that the treatment effect only has a few weeks to 
actually have an effect on sales, and only a few control weeks prior to the first stores being 
treated. 
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Hypothesis 
The main hypothesis for this research project is based on the overall interest in figuring out 
the impact Maze treatment had on sales in Expert. Therefore, the first hypothesis is simple but 
clear; 
Hypothesis 1 
H0; Maze treatment has no impact on sales 
H1; Maze treatment has a positive impact on sales 
In addition, as previously stated, the store managers report a weekly self-evaluation of how 
well their performance related to the treatment is. It would be interesting to see whether those 
who reported best numbers actually had a greater effect of the treatment. Therefore, this is the 
second hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 2 
H0; Maze treatment has equal effect for those stores that evaluated best compliance 
with treatment and those stores that reported worst compliance with treatment 
H1; Maze treatment has greater effect for those stores that evaluated best compliance 
with treatment 
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5. The Impact of the Maze Treatment 
I now consider what impact the treatment had on sales in Expert. In the output tables and the 
presentation of the results I use different variable names, please refer to Table A in Appendix 
1 for a more detailed description of these. First of all I present Graph 1 that shows average 
sales per store over the sample period for pilot stores, the rest of the Expert-owned stores and 
all control stores respectively. This is to give a virtual illustration of how sales varies during 
the year, how the Christmas season affect sales, and how well the treated and control group 
move together. Although all Expert-owned stores are treated, the pilot stores are shown 
separately on this first graph, to illustrate their difference from the rest of the Expert-owned 
store and control stores. 
Graph 1 – Average sales per store 
 
First, this confirms that the pilot stores have greater average weekly sales compared to the 
remainder of the Expert stores. The same applies Expert-owned stores relative to control 
stores; however, the distance in sales from Expert-owned stores to control stores are less 
substantial. Secondly, the major differential sales periods are, as predicted, during the 
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Christmas- and New Year season when sales more than doubles. There are no surprising 
fluctuations that cannot be explained by external incidents, such as holidays or days of 
closure. A noticeable dip occurs during week 16 of 2011, which is during Easter when stores 
were closed for several days, and drop in sales is a natural consequence. Then from the end of 
May 2011 and onward another increase in sales happened during the period when people 
receive their holiday pay and tax refunds. During the general staff holiday in July 2011 
another natural dip occurs, but then sales stabilize and slowly increase all the way until 
around week 47 when the Christmas season sales period kicks in. 
The treated- and control stores move very nice and smooth together suggesting that the 
control stores are similar in nature as the treated stores. If the control stores fluctuated very 
differently from the treated stores, reconsiderations had to be made with regards to whether 
they could fit as an appropriate control group. From the graph we can also see that the 
difference between treated- and control stores on average becomes greater during the 
Christmas season. Nevertheless, there is both a Christmas season prior to treatment and after 
treatment is introduced, and thus I should cope quite well with this effect in the analysis.  
Main effect testing hypothesis 1 
To measure the direct impact that the Maze treatment have on sales I use the basic 
specifications explained in details under empirical strategy. Model 1 in Table 2 shows the first 
empirical result of the treatment effect. This regression includes clustered standard error and 
fixed effects on both time and store. The entire sample period is included in this first 
regression, and the treatment dummy variable takes value 1 when treatment is introduced, 
zero otherwise. Furthermore, all treated- and control stores have been included. The 
coefficient size from this regression is very small, 0.00905, which is equivalent of a 0.905 
percent increase in sales after implementing Maze. The result is not statistically significant, 
meaning that statistically the result is not different from zero. Hence, the first regression result 
suggests no treatment effect. 
However, this regression result might be affected by that the treatment needs an 
implementation period before having any effect on sales. There are several reasons why this 
might be the case. First of all, the employees need to learn how to use the MyMaze system, 
and might have to spend more time on this leaving less time to ordinary activities. Second, it 
is reasonable to think that the treatment tools have to be practiced in as routines; some trial 
and error might be needed to find the best way to adapt, and employees may need time to 
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practice how to communicate better and more fluently with customers. Third, the incentives 
for store managers might be strengthened when the first store manager meeting after 
implementation were held in the beginning of November 2011. This might be as the store 
manager meeting reinforced the importance of the treatment and the competitive spirit, and it 
may be that this meeting was needed to share first hand experiences with the treatment tools. 
If this was the case, then this is similar to what Cadena et al. (2011) found to be decisive in 
their research, with regards to that treatment effect only showed to be significant when bank 
managers had incentives to follow up on their employees. Finally, employees might need time 
to actually be convinced that this way of allocating effort and time works, and that they might 
need time to see the benefits of meeting the treatment requirements of effort and engagement. 
To analyze whether such implementation period existed, I created a new length variable that 
takes a value according to how many weeks the store have used Maze treatment. For example, 
if the store implemented treatment in week 17, the length variable takes value 4 in week 20. 
Furthermore, I used a loop to create dummy variables for each 5 week intervention length 
interval, such that length 1 to 5 weeks of treatment becomes one treatment dummy, length 6 
to 10 becomes a second dummy and so on. All these dummy variables replaced the single 
treatment variable from the first regression in this second regression. Other than that, the 
second regression has the same specifications as the first one. From running this regression I 
get the results presented in Model 2 in Table 2. What we can observe is that there seems to be 
a 15 week implementation period, as the treatment coefficients remains negative over this 
entire first 15 week period. An even more detailed analysis shows that this is more precisely a 
14 week period. However, from week 16 and onwards we clearly observe a shift to positive 
treatment coefficients. This suggests that there is an implementation period, and that further 
analysis is appropriate to fully examine the treatment effect on sales. 
Using the knowledge from the second regression and the more detailed analysis, two 
additional treatment variables were generated. The first new dummy variable takes value 1 if 
treatment length is from 1 to 14 weeks, zero otherwise. The second dummy variable takes 
value 1 if treatment length is 15 weeks or above, zero otherwise. Then running the same 
regression as previously, with the same sample period and specifications only having changed 
the treatment variables, reveals some interesting results. The coefficient of the first treatment 
variable (length 1 to 14 weeks) is negative 0.0199 or almost minus 2 percent, but not 
statistically different from zero. The interesting part of this regression, however, is the 
coefficient of the second treatment variable (length 15 weeks or above). The result shows a 
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positive effect of 0.0476 or 4.76 percent increase in sales. The coefficient is statistically 
significant at 5 % level. Contradictory to the first empirical result, this suggests an increase in 
sales of almost 5 percent as a result of the treatment, after going through a 14 week period of 
learning and adapting the routine. With regards to hypothesis 1, the null hypothesis is being 
rejected. The alternative hypothesis, stating that there is a positive effect of the treatment on 
sales, have statistically significant support of being greater than zero. Hence, I conclude that 
there is a positive treatment effect, in that treated stores increases sales by more than control 
stores in the sample period. If this is true, then this means that employees were not fully 
efficient in their work prior to treatment. This in turn would suggest that employees were 
likely procrastinating, as their pay would be higher and their career path likely better if they 
showed more effort at work. Having a bonus scheme as part of their salary, tied to how well 
they perform, is a strong incentive to perform at the very best. If employees still choose to 
procrastinate, as they seem to have done in Expert, this actually means that they have been 
throwing money out of their pockets, as they could have earned more by not procrastinating. 
The results just presented are based on a strict econometric model, with standard robust errors 
and fixed effects. The results are quite clear in that there is an effect of the treatment on sales 
after some 14 weeks of an implementation period. For the following analysis this is the model 
that will be used as the preferred model, with the two separate treatment periods controlling 
for this implementation period. Nevertheless, even though the result is statistically significant 
positive does not mean it can be blindly trusted. 
Differential effects 1 - testing hypothesis 2 
One of the goals with this analysis is to test whether those who report that they fully go 
through and comply with the treatment program, actually perform better than those who did 
not. For this to be analyzed, all data on self-reported evaluations were aggregated on each 
store. Then I separated the aggregated evaluations into two groups and created one dummy 
variable for top half average evaluation and one dummy variable for bottom half average 
evaluation. Then, in order to separate the treatment effect of each of the two groups of 
evaluations, I created two additional dummy variables. The first variable is an interaction 
variable between the first 14 weeks of treatment and the group with best self-evaluations, 
which takes value 1 only if both dummy variables intervention of 1 to 14 weeks treatment 
length and best self-evaluation takes value 1, zero otherwise. The second variable is similar, 
only this is the interaction between 15 or more weeks of treatment and the group with best 
self-evaluations. 
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The specifications are the same, beside from separating the best self-evaluated stores from the 
worst self-evaluated stores. The base group in this regression is those stores who report worst 
self-evaluations. Their effect is represented by the same variables as the preferred model 
(intervention1to14 and intervention15more). The two interaction dummy variables are then 
added to the regression, and these become the additional effect of being among the best self-
evaluation stores. Running the regression reveals some interesting findings, which are 
presented in Table 3.  
First, focusing on the total average of self-evaluations, I find support in that those stores in the 
best group have, according to the interaction coefficient in Model 1 in Table 3, a coefficient 
estimate of 4.21 percentage points larger treatment effect on sales after 15 weeks or more with 
treatment, compared to stores that reported the worst self-evaluations. This coefficient is 
significant at 10% level. Similar effect is found for the first 14 weeks with treatment, where 
the coefficient estimates a 3.86 percentage points greater treatment effect for stores who 
report best self-evaluations compared to those stores who report worst-self evaluations. This 
coefficient is significant at 5% level, backing up and increasing the confidence in the first 
coefficient. Hence, those reporting that they comply more with the treatment and put more 
effort into fully carrying out the treatment as intended, actually perform better. In turn, this 
means that the null hypothesis is rejected once again, and there is statistical significant 
support in that the alternative hypothesis is likely. 
In the theoretical review there was a lot of focus concerning the importance of constant 
immediate feedback, especially through pep talks held every morning. Therefore, it is 
interesting to see whether the effect on sales differed in relation to those who reported the best 
pep talk evaluation, compared to those who reported worst pep talk evaluations. It is 
reasonable to expect that these results do not differ much from the results in the previous 
section, as those who report well on self-evaluations are presumably more likely to be part of 
those who report good pep talks as well. This is because pep talks are one of the parameters 
included in self-evaluations, and also because one would expect those who report well on one 
evaluation, to rate their effort in other areas similar too. The results from running the 
regression with pep talk interactions are reported in Model 2 in Table 3. The coefficients are 
slightly weaker than from the previous regression, but the results are otherwise similar and as 
expected. From 15 weeks or more treatment length, the coefficient is 0.0163, but not 
statistically different from zero. This suggests that there is a small, but positive and 
noticeable, difference of 1.63 percentage points greater treatment effect for those who report 
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best pep talks compared to those who report worst pep talk. For the first 14 weeks, the 
difference is 3.26 percent and significant at 10% level. This means that there are results 
backing up the arguments from the theoretical review, regarding that the tools may ease the 
procrastination problem. In fact, it seems like pep talk and its related feedback does have 
some effect on sales, but the results become stronger when comparing sales in stores reporting 
best self-evaluations compared to those stores reporting worst self-evaluations. 
Even though this analysis of differential effects have some limitations in that it cannot 
separately determine the effect of each tool, as they are highly likely to affect each other, it 
clearly signals that thorough implementation has greater effect on sales. Surprisingly, some 
stores report very low self-evaluations, and one could wonder why this is so. Maybe low 
evaluations means that the treatment is not prioritized enough, such that the treatment effect is 
not sufficiently strong enough to increase sales. It could also be that those stores reporting 
worse evaluations face an organizational challenge or conflict with the treatment, with regards 
to convincing store managers and employees that the changes are advantageous and 
preferable. It may be that store manager and employees fail to see the broad total picture of 
their organizations challenges and the potential utilizations that they can gain personally from 
the treatment. Instead, they might regard the program as just another measure thread down 
from higher in the organizational hierarchy. However, and importantly, this last regression 
result supports the main analysis in that there is an effect of the treatment on sales. If the 
treatment had no effect, we should not have seen any effect on grouping these stores based on 
self-evaluations of the treatment. 
An interesting outcome from this analysis is that, during the implementation period, treatment 
seems to have a significant 4 percent negative effect on sales for those stores reporting low 
treatment compliance compared to control stores. Why is this? The likely reason would be 
that they spend a lot of time on the new activities, leaving less time to focus on sales. 
However, this should also apply (and maybe even stronger) to those stores that fully comply 
with the treatment.  Therefore, another possible reason could be that the store managers are 
not capable or willing to fully comply with the treatment, whether it is caused by lack of 
ability or that he/she does not believe in the treatment. If this is so, then shifting work tasks 
partly towards the treatment tools, without fully complying with it, uses up valuable time that 
was previously spent on more efficient activities. This could also apply to other employees; 
they may lack abilities or belief about the new program, leading to that they only partly go 
through with the new activities, leaving less time to other more efficient activities.  
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Differential effects 2 – store size 
This part of the analysis is to test whether the size of the stores affected the treatment impact 
on sales. Size has been defined based on average sales instead of actual sales area, as some 
store sizes are not reported in the data. The average sales were divided into four separate 
quartiles based on size, and one dummy variable was generated for each group. Importantly 
for the identification strategy, it is preferable that the time of that implementation of treatment 
did not take place by groups, in that all stores in one size quartile got treated simultaneously 
and before the next size quartile. Graph 2 shows that this was not the case, and that 
implementation time was somehow spread among the different groups.  
 
Graph 2 – Time of implementation 
 
Then I ran four different regressions, only including treated stores of one size quartile in each 
regression, thus excluding the other size quartiles. All control stores were included in all four 
regressions. The results are presented in Table 4.  
Interestingly, it seems like the treatment have greatest effect on the smallest and the largest 
stores. The treatment coefficient for 15 weeks or more with treatment, see Model 1 in Table 4, 
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is for the smallest stores 0.0955 or an increase in sales of 9.55 percent, being statistical 
significant even at 1% level. For the largest stores, Model 4 in Table 4, results show a weaker 
effect, but still a considerable increase in sales. The coefficient is 0.0591, suggesting that the 
largest stores have an increase in sales, as a result of the treatment on 5.91 percent. Again, the 
coefficient is statistical different from zero at 5% significance level. The coefficients for 
medium sized stores, Model 2 and 3 in Table 4, only show weak positive effect on sales, not 
being statistically different from zero.  
This may suggest that the strength of the tools that the treatment uses varies with number of 
employees, and or the responsibility that each employee carries. In small stores with few 
employees, one might think that it is easier to implement treatment more efficiently, and that 
the tools therefore work more powerful. For example, during the short pep talk each morning 
the feedback can be more directed at each individual seller, making the feedback more 
constructive and precise. In addition, store managers will have more time to observe and 
guide employees in actual sales situations. In small stores it is probably easier to feel closer 
and thus more responsible to the stores performance, as each employee contribute to a 
substantial amount of total sales. When you add this to the fact that better performances also 
lead to higher pay, it is reasonable to argue that it is easier to induce employees away from 
procrastinating toward effort enhancement. In the largest stores, however, routines are in 
general presumably very important, and this might be why treatment works well here too. As 
the treatment brings along a new set of routines, they might be easier to implement in a large 
store with employees working according to routines. Furthermore, employees in large stores 
might have distanced themselves from responsibility prior to treatment, and these new tool 
can be a powerful way to bring this responsibility closer and to become clearer. 
Robustness of main results 
From Graph 1 we could see that the treated- and control stores move close to hand in hand. 
Nevertheless, during Christmas season sales the difference between them increased, which 
could mean that the total treatment effect was driven by this effect. This would not mean that 
Christmas season sales was the only reason for the treatment to show any effect, rather it 
would mean that the treatment works stronger during this busy period. 
In order to investigate the extent to which the treatment effect is driven by the Christmas 
season sales, I investigate the robustness of the analysis by altering the sample period. This is 
done in two different ways. First, I removed all observations from week 47 and up until week 
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3 the following year. This is done for both pre-treatment period (2010/2011) and in treatment 
period (2011/2012) for all stores, including control stores. Running this regression with same 
specifications as the preferred model, only altering the sample period by excluding some 
weeks, will almost completely remove differential sales effect from the sample. The results 
are found in Model 2 in Table 5. These coefficients show very little effect of the treatment, 
and not statistically different from zero.  
This may suggest that the original results are entirely driven by Christmas season sales, in that 
almost all effect from the treatment occurs during this period. However, recall that treatment 
was mainly implemented during fall of 2011, and that the treatment period when excluding 
the Christmas season sales becomes more limited. That being said, this may also suggest that 
the tools in the treatment work better during busy periods. This could, for example, be 
explained by that customers appreciate assistances more during their Christmas season 
shopping when buying presents. Also, it could mean that customers are less decisive when 
they visit stores during this period, such that service minded sellers with adequate knowledge 
and scent may sell more during such periods. 
The second way of investigating the importance of any Christmas season sales effect in this 
analysis is to cut the whole sample period, such that it includes year 2011 only. In addition, 
the effect of the January sales and the effect of Christmas season sales in 2011 must be 
excluded. Therefore, in this second robustness test I only included observations from week 4 
until week 46 of 2011. The results are found in Model 3 in Table 5, and show effect 
equivalent of zero. Again, this suggests a limited effect of the treatment, except from during 
the busy Christmas season. But, as in the previous section, the treatment length is very limited 
in this sample period. Only the pilot stores will have treatment length above 15 weeks, and 
therefore the results are not conclusive in any way. 
As shown in the second differential effects analysis, there seems to be a greater effect for 
those stores that are either very small or very large. How would the treatment effect respond 
to changes in the sample period by excluding Christmas season sales? The specifications for 
this regression are like in the previous section when excluding Christmas season sales; hence, 
the total sample period stretches from week 44 in 2010 to week 11 in 2012, but excluding all 
observations from week 47 to week 3 the following year, for both year 2010 and 2011 
Christmas season sales. Shown in Model 4 in Table 5, the coefficient for treatment effect after 
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length of 15 weeks or more is 0.0501, suggesting a 5 percent increase in sales even though 
Christmas season sales are excluded. This coefficient is statistically significant at 5% level. 
This last finding suggests that those stores with treatment seeming to have greatest effect on 
sales also enjoy increased sales outside the Christmas season period, which is contradictory to 
the first result when excluding Christmas season sales seemed to lead to little or no treatment 
effect. Running the same regression only for middle sized stores (not reported) actually shows 
a decrease in sales of almost 4 percent after 15 or more weeks with treatment, however, this 
coefficient is not statistically different from zero. When doing the same procedure for those 
stores evaluating their compliance with the treatment highest (Model 5 in Table 5), results are 
similar to the estimates in Model 3 in that there is no treatment effect outside the Christmas 
seasons.  
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6. Conclusions and discussions 
Expert Norge AS faces sharp competition in the electronic consumer market, and as a result 
of this their financial development has not been satisfactory recent years. As part of their 
change program, the Maze treatment was introduced in Expert-owned stores to increase 
productivity of sellers, which ultimately was supposed to increase “Hit Rate” and sales. I find 
supportive indications that the treatment actually increased sales, without considering the cost 
side of the treatment. Thus, the result of hypothesis 1 is that the null hypothesis is being 
rejected, and that there are statistically supportive indications of a positive effect on sales as a 
result of the treatment. The confidence in the results are being built on comparing weekly 
sales in treated Expert-owned stores to non-treated Expert-branded owner-occupied stores 
over a period of 72 weeks. More specifically, I find that the treatment requires somewhere 
around 15 weeks on average to start having a positive effect, which suggests that the 
treatment requires an implementation period. Several arguments for this have been suggested. 
In addition, I find that the treatment effect is greater in the smallest and the largest stores 
compared to the middle sized stores. The treatment also seems to be affected by Christmas 
season sales, in that the treatment effect seemingly has stronger effect during these busy 
periods. Nevertheless, when only including stores that had the strongest effect based on size 
in this analysis, excluding Christmas season sales, the treatment still shows an increase in 
sales of 5 percent. This suggests that the treatment effect is not entirely driven by Christmas 
season sales effect. However, doing the same analysis only for those stores reporting highest 
compliance with the treatment, I still find that the treatment effect is driven by this Christmas 
season. 
Interestingly, the stores evaluating that they comply the most with the treatment tools also 
perform better. These results are consistent both for pep talk evaluations and total self-
evaluations. As a response to hypothesis 2, the null hypothesis is being rejected, and the 
alternative hypothesis of treatment having greater effect the higher evaluated compliance gets 
statistically supportive indications. Ideally, I would have liked to test the different tools in the 
treatment separately, for example by introducing each tool at different times, such that I could 
have estimated the effect of each tool more precisely. This was not possible in this research, 
as the process regarding the implementation had already gone too far at the time of the start of 
the research. This could, however, be subject of future research. Moreover, a randomization 
of stores that were treated would have been preferred, as this would put even more confidence 
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in the estimations. As a result of the stores not being randomly selected, the results must be 
interpreted with cautiousness. There are noticeable differences both in size and nature 
between Expert-owned and owner-occupied stores. It may be that the treatment effect is only 
happening due to some other unobservable event that only occurred in Expert-owned stores. 
However, according to HR-manager in Expert Norge AS, there are no obvious events only 
taking place in Expert-owned stores beyond the treatment. 
This research suggests one combination of tools that can be used to increase productivity and 
sales. Nevertheless, this is just one of many ways to organize behavioral activities as an effort 
to overcome behavioral problems. The contribution of the research in this respect is to present 
a centrally designed program, and analyze whether it succeeds in enhancing the effort of 
employees. The analysis indicates that the tools are working, which is consistent with the 
related procrastination model and the existing theory. However, other tools and combinations 
are subject to be studied to find additional ways of organizing and to gain more insight about 
the tools. A more detailed analysis would allow for the strength of each tool to be estimated. 
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Appendix 1 – Table A 
Description of variables and other terms used in Table 1 to Table 5 
Variable/Term Description 
Sales Weekly gross sales. 
Lsales Ln(Sales). 
Intervention 1 when a store has implemented treatment, 0 otherwise. 
Intervention1to14 1 when a store has implemented treatment and treatment has lasted from 1 week up until 14 weeks, 0 otherwise. 
Intervention15more 1 when store has implemented treatment and treatment has lasted 15 weeks or more, 0 otherwise. 
Intervention1to5, Intervention6to10 
, …, Intervention46to50 
1 when store has implemented treatment and the length of the treatment (in weeks) is within the interval of the variable name, 0 
otherwise. 
Peptalkbest1to14 Interaction dummy between Intervention1to14 and Peptalkbest (see Appendix 2), hence 1 when both Intervention1to14 and 
Peptalkbest takes value 1, 0 otherwise. 
Peptalkbest15more Interaction dummy between Intervention15more and Peptalkbest (see Appendix2), hence 1 when both Intervention15more and 
Peptalkbest takes value 1, 0 otherwise. 
Selfevalbest1to14 Interaction dummy between Intervention1to14 and Peptalkbest (see Appendix2), hence 1 when both Intervention1to14 and 
Peptalkbest takes value 1, 0 otherwise. 
Selfevalbest15more Interaction dummy between Intervention15more and Selfevalbest (see Appendix2) hence 1 when both Intervention15more and 
Selfebalbest takes value 1, 0 otherwise. 
Selfevalbest 1 if store is among those having their self-evaluation rated in top half on average of all treated stores, 0 otherwise. 
Smallest_stores 1 if store is in first quartile of average weekly sales (of treated stores, from lowest average), 0 otherwise. 
Second_smallest_stores 1 if store is in second quartile of average weekly sales (of treated stores, from lowest average), 0 otherwise. 
Second_largest_stores 1 if store is in third quartile of average weekly sales (of treated stores, from lowest average), 0 otherwise. 
Largest_stores 1 if store is in fourth quartile of average weekly sales (of treated stores, from lowest average), 0 otherwise 
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Smallest_largest_stores 1 if store is either in first or fourth quartile of average weekly sales, 0 otherwise 
w44y2010 to w11y2012 The entire data sample period. This stretches from week 44 in year 2010 until week 11 in year 2012. 
w44y2010 to w11y2012 ex Christmas 
Season 
The entire data sample period, except from Christmas seasons sales. Week 47 in year 2010 until week 3 in year 2011, and week 47 
in year 2011 until week 3 in year 2012 has been dropped. 
w04y2011 to w46y2011 Not the entire sample period. Only year 2011 and also excluding Christmas season sales. Week 4 in year 2011 until week 46 in year 
2011. 
All_stores All stores; All treated stores (pilot stores and Expert owned stores) and all control stores. 
Peptalkbest 1 if store is among those stores having their pep talk evaluation rated in top half on average of all treated stores, 0 otherwise. 
Selfevalbest 1 if store is among those having their self-evaluation rated in top half on average of all treated stores, 0 otherwise. 
Number of customers Weekly average number of customers visiting the store. Based on counters at the store entrance. 
Store size Store size. Data not complete but provides an indication. 
Hitrate Weekly average “Hit Rate”.  This is the ratio between number of customers buying and number of customers visiting the store. 
Clickrate Weekly average “Click Rate”. This is the ratio between number of customers contacted and number of customers visiting the store. 
Number of customers buying Weekly average number of customers buying a good. Based on number of sales. 
Number of customer contacted Weekly average number of customer contacted. Based on number of clicks reported by the employees using the clicker function. 
Peptalk evaluation score (1-7) Weekly average peptalk score. The score ratio is 1 to 7, where 7 is top score.  
Morning routines evaluation score (1-
7) 
Weekly average morning routines score. The score ratio is 1 to 7, where 7 is top score.  
Sales observation evaluation score (1-
7) 
Weekly average sales observation routines score. The score ratio is 1 to 7, where 7 is top score. 
Self-evaluation score (1-7) Weekly average peptalk-, morning routines- and sales observation evaluation score. The score ratio is 1 to 7, where 7 is top score. 
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Table 1 – Summary statistics 
Variables / Characteristics Treatment 
Mean 
(SD) 
Control 
Mean 
(SD) 
Total  
Mean 
(SD) 
Sales (weekly) 689.247,4 
(534.692,5) 
371.921,5 
(276.655,5) 
556.447,1 
(471.999,7) 
Number of customers buying (weekly) 567,4 
(351,0) 
375,3 
(236,1) 
484,9 
(321,4) 
Store size (m2) 1029,4 
(601,8) 
478,0 
(244,1) 
796,6 
(555,5) 
Hitrate (weekly) 0,2701 
(0,0782) 
n/a n/a 
Clickrate (weekly) 1,1563 
(0,2765) 
n/a n/a 
Number of customers (weekly) 2.356,3 
(1.579,9) 
n/a n/a 
Number of customers contacted 
(weekly) 
2988,3 
(2122,6) 
n/a n/a 
Peptalk evaluation score (1-7) 5,98 
(1,02) 
n/a n/a 
Morning routines evaluation score (1-7) 5,79 
(1,09) 
n/a n/a 
Sales observation evaluation score (1-7) 5,54 
(1,16) 
n/a n/a 
Self-evaluation score (1-7) 5,69 
(0,74) 
n/a n/a 
 
Summary statistics are based on available data and some may not be fully complete. “Hit Rate” and number of customers are not available from control 
stores as many lack counters at the store entrance. All the other statistics not reported from control stores are treatment generated statistics.
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Table 2 – Intervention effect 
 Dependent variable is sales 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 all_stores all_stores all_stores 
    
intervention 0.00905   
 (0.0160)   
intervention1to14   -0.0199 
   (0.0140) 
intervention15more   0.0476** 
   (0.0218) 
intervention1to5  -0.00845  
  (0.0159)  
intervention6to10  -0.0366**  
  (0.0179)  
intervention11to15  -0.00157  
  (0.0191)  
intervention16to20  0.0503**  
  (0.0228)  
intervention21to25  0.0783***  
  (0.0259)  
intervention26to30  0.0146  
  (0.0274)  
intervention31to35  0.0178  
  (0.0305)  
intervention36to40  0.0904**  
  (0.0398)  
intervention41to45  0.0869*  
  (0.0458)  
intervention46to50  0.0594  
  (0.0608)  
Constant 12.80*** 12.65*** 12.64*** 
 (0.0423) (0.0261) (0.0235) 
 
Observations 7,053 7,053 7,053 
R-squared 0.687 0.690 0.689 
Number of stores 98 98 98 
Sample period w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table reports the regression results of the program effect on productivity. The 
productivity measure used as dependent variable is sales. The independent variables are 
intervention program dummies, fully described in table A. This analysis use data from 
MyMaze and Expert internal systems. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust 
standard errors clustered at store level, with time- and store fixed effects.
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Table 3 – Effect of high compliance 
 Dependent variable is sales 
 (1) (2) 
 Selfevaluation Peptalk 
   
intervention1to14 -0.0382** -0.0352** 
 (0.0161) (0.0166) 
intervention15more 0.0258 0.0389 
 (0.0236) (0.0243) 
selfevalbest1to14 0.0386**  
 (0.0192)  
selfevalbest15more 0.0421*  
 (0.0225)  
peptalkbest1to14  0.0326* 
  (0.0192) 
peptalkbest15more  0.0163 
  (0.0230) 
Constant 12.64*** 12.64*** 
 (0.0234) (0.0234) 
 
Observations 7,053 7,053 
R-squared 0.690 0.689 
Number of storegroup 98 98 
Sample period w44y2010 to w11y2012 w44y2010 to w11y2012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table reports the regression results of the program effect, and the high compliance effect of the program, on productivity. The productivity 
measure used as dependent variable is sales. The independent variables are intervention program dummies and dummies for high program 
compliance, fully described in table A. This analysis use data from MyMaze and Expert internal systems. All regressions are estimated using 
OLS with robust standard errors clustered at store level, with time- and store fixed effects. 
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Table 4 – Store size effect 
 Dependent variable is sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 smallest_stores second_smallest_stores second_largest_stores largest_stores 
     
intervention1to14 -0.0258 -0.0140 -0.0572** -0.00552 
 (0.0238) (0.0170) (0.0249) (0.0203) 
intervention15more 0.0955*** 0.0247 0.0159 0.0591** 
 (0.0337) (0.0307) (0.0318) (0.0259) 
Constant 12.61*** 12.76*** 12.87*** 13.00*** 
 (0.0247) (0.0234) (0.0243) (0.0240) 
     
Observations 4,029 3,959 3,959 3,959 
R-squared 0.637 0.651 0.651 0.652 
Number of storegroup 56 55 55 55 
Sample period w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table reports the regression results of the program effect on productivity, separating stores based on store sizes. The productivity measure 
used as dependent variable is sales. The independent variables are intervention program dummies, fully described in table A. This analysis use 
data from MyMaze and Expert internal systems. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors clustered at store level, with 
time- and store fixed effects. 
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Table 5 – Robustness test 
Dependent variable is sales 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 all_stores all_stores all_stores smallest_largest_stores selfevalbest 
      
intervention1to14 -0.0199 -0.0127 -0.0179 -0.00342 0.00666 
 (0.0140) (0.0139) (0.0145) (0.0168) (0.0191) 
intervention15more 0.0476** 0.0106 0.00234 0.0501** 0.0187 
 (0.0218) (0.0229) (0.0252) (0.0250) (0.0287) 
Constant 12.64*** 12.66*** 12.81*** 12.57*** 12.69*** 
 (0.0230) (0.0233) (0.0197) (0.0250) (0.0256) 
      
Observations 7,053 5,290 4,212 3,778 3,724 
R-squared 0.689 0.395 0.417 0.352 0.375 
Number of storegroup 98 98 98 70 69 
Sample period w44y2010 to 
w11y2012 
w44y2010 to w11y2012 
ex Christmas Season 
w04y2011 to 
w46y2011 
w044y2010 to w11y2012 ex 
Christmas Season 
w044y2010 to w11y2012 
ex Christmas Season 
Robust standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
This table reports the regression results of the program effect on productivity, with more limited sample periods. In addition, the table reports the 
regression results of the program including only some store sizes and stores with high compliance, when limiting the sample period. The 
productivity measure used as dependent variable is sales. The independent variables are intervention program dummies, fully described in table 
A. This analysis use data from MyMaze and Expert internal systems. All regressions are estimated using OLS with robust standard errors 
clustered at store level, with time- and store fixed effects. 
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Appendix 2 – Exhibit 1 
An extract of an example of a daily work schedule from the week schedule in MyMaze 
 
Uke 20 – 
onsdag 
Utført Tid Ansvar Beskrivelse 
 07:00 - 08:00 Navn 1 
 
Pris på alle varer 
 
Ingen varer uten pris, dette gjelder: Utstilling, pigger, hyller og 
galger. priser på hvitevarer 
 07:00 - 08:00 Deltid 
data/ 
foto/ 
tele 
Vareplassering / Varetrykk egen avdeling (G) 
 
Etterfylle varer.Trekk frem varer i hylle. Komprimere varer. 
 07:00 - 08:00 Navn 2 
 
Minusbeholdning ElGuide (G) 
 
Program 111 Forespørsel minusbeholdning. Finn ut årsak til minus 
og korriger. Krediter og slå inn riktig kode eller lag 
enkeltregistrering i Exnet 
 08:00 - 09:45 Navn 1 
 
30 dagers varer ut i butikk 
 08:00 - 09:45 BS Butikk Godkjenn stemplinger 
 
Gjennomgå gårsdagens stemplinger/fravær og godkjenne dagen 
 08:00 - 10:00 Navn 1 
 
SIU liste (G) 
 
Program 179 Solgt ikke utlevert. Gjennomgå Siu liste. Sjekk alle linjer 
med utgått utleveringsdato. Rett de linjene som ikke har beholning ved 
å telle disse inn.  
 
 08:00 - 10:00 Navn 2 
 
SIU liste (G) 
 
Program 179 Solgt ikke utlevert. Gjennomgå Siu liste. Sjekk alle linjer 
med utgått utleveringsdato. Rett de linjene som ikke har beholning ved 
å telle disse inn.  
 
 08:00 - 10:00 Navn 1 Minusbeholdning ElGuide (G) 
 
Program 111 Forespørsel minusbeholdning. Finn ut årsak til minus 
og korriger. Krediter og slå inn riktig kode eller lag 
enkeltregistrering i Exnet 
 08:00 - 10:00 BS Butikksjef Vaktsjef i butikk 
 
Denne instruksen må følges opp i fravær av butikksjefen 
 09:45 - 10:00 BS Butikksjef Morgenmøte 
 
Gjennomgå plakat og status win 
Diskuter og analyser årsak 
Bli enig om korrigeringer/tiltak 
Gjennomgå dagsmål for selgere 
 
This exhibit is from the internal systems of MyMaze at www.maze.no, and is not accessible without 
logon-id.
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Exhibit 2 
An example of sales figures from MyMaze 
This exhibit is downloaded from the internal system of MyMaze at www.maze.no, and is not accessible without logon-id. 
